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When the Whip Is Gone: What Pass-Through Voting Means for Engagement

Can shareholder engagement remain effective when voting power is dispersed?

Pass-Through Voting

Pass-through voting hands voting decisions back from asset managers to asset owners. It also weakens the threat that has made engagement work. This article explains why, shows how large the effect is in Switzerland, and predicts how asset managers, proxy advisors and boards will respond.

Voting is the backstop that makes the other levers credible.

Engagement needs a vote behind it

Every engagement between an investor and a board carries an unspoken condition. If the board does not respond, the investor can vote against the chair, the compensation committee or the pay package at the next AGM. That threat gives a private conversation its weight.

Voting is not the only lever. Engagement also works through information exchange, long-term relationships, collective initiatives, public statements and, as a last resort, shareholder proposals. Most of these levers, however, draw their weight from the same source: the board knows that shareholders can express their view at the AGM, and that this view becomes public. Voting is the backstop that makes the other levers credible.

For two decades, this link was tight. A handful of large asset managers held a growing share of the votes, and the stewardship team that engaged with a company also decided how all of those votes were cast. When it asked for change, the board knew what stood behind the request.

In practice, the threat rarely has to be carried out. Engagement usually achieves enough that shareholders see no reason to vote against the board. SWIPRA's mid-season review of the 2026 AGMs, for example, attributes higher approval rates for remuneration reports to a more intensive dialogue between boards and investors.1

Where engagement fails, the votes are there. In its analysis of the 2026 Swiss AGM season, SWIPRA finds that 97 agenda items would have been rejected without the votes of anchor shareholders such as families, founders or the state, up from 37 in 2025.2  Of these, 45 were board elections and 25 were votes on compensation amounts. The threat is real, and at companies without an anchor shareholder, minority shareholders decide the outcome.

Pass-through voting changes this. Asset managers now let their clients choose their own voting policy, and in some cases vote themselves. The manager still engages, but it no longer controls all the votes that back its engagement. What does this do to the effectiveness of engagement?

What is changing

Since 2022, the three largest index managers have introduced pass-through programmes. BlackRock started with institutional clients; Vanguard and State Street followed with programmes that also reach retail investors. Uptake differs sharply by client type. About a quarter of eligible institutional assets at BlackRock now vote under a policy chosen by the client, while in Vanguard's retail programme the share is around one tenth of one percent.3

For now, the effect on AGM outcomes is limited. Retail uptake is negligible, and even among institutional clients only part of the assets has moved. SWIPRA's outlook for the 2026 AGM season also describes overall uptake as still modest,4  while its review of the season observes that split voting is rising and making AGM outcomes harder to predict.5  This article therefore describes where the market is heading, and the effects discussed below will grow with uptake.

Two features matter for what follows. First, most clients who choose do not vote individually. They pick from a menu of policies, most of them written and administered by proxy advisors.

Second, the choice is not random. In one Vanguard ESG fund, 80% of participating investors chose the Glass Lewis ESG policy, compared with 18% of participants across the programme.6  Owners sort themselves by their views.

Pass-through voting keeps the party label but removes the whip.

A lesson from political science

Political scientists have studied a similar problem for decades. A party whose leadership can deliver its members' votes in parliament is a credible negotiating partner. When members vote as individuals, or when the number of parties suddenly doubles, the same party loses bargaining power even if its size is unchanged.

An asset manager voting all its shares under one policy resembles such a disciplined party. Pass-through voting keeps the party label but removes the whip. For the board, the shareholder base starts to look like a parliament with more and smaller factions.

The analogy is useful because political science offers ready-made tools. They measure how fragmented a vote is, how likely a bloc is to decide an outcome, and how parties position themselves when voters can choose. The paper applies these tools to shareholder engagement.

The more votes follow policies instead of managers, the more engagement shifts from joint problem-solving to update-sharing.

Four ways pass-through voting weakens engagement

Votes leak. Some of the votes that used to back an engagement now go to owners who do not follow the manager's position. If the board ignores the request, fewer votes will be cast against it. The weaker the alignment between the manager and its clients, the larger the loss.

Leakage costs more than proportionally. In most markets, votes rarely fail, and a board fears a failed vote only when an unusual wave of dissent comes together. The chance that a block of votes tips the outcome rises steeply only as the block approaches the size needed to create such a wave. Losing part of the block therefore costs a larger part of its ability to tip a vote.

Boards also care about the level of dissent, even when a vote passes. This second channel weakens only in proportion to the leakage. The overall effect on engagement lies between the two, and closer to the second where votes rarely fail.

Fragmentation insures the board. A few large blocs occasionally turn against management at the same time. Many small, independent voters rarely do. Spreading votes across many decision makers therefore reduces the risk of a revolt, even if average support for the engager is unchanged.

Voting policies become the new parties. The number of owners who vote matters little. What matters is how concentrated the policies they choose are, and how closely those policies match the engager's request. If most clients stay with the manager's default policy, little changes. If they spread across proxy advisor policies, influence shifts to the advisors behind those policies.

How different are these policies? Our coding of the 2026 benchmark and specialty voting policies that Glass Lewis and ISS offer in pass-through programmes shows that their specialty policies prescribe the same reaction as the providers' benchmark policies on 85% of the governance rules, but on only 46% of the rules on diversity, climate and other E&S topics.7  On governance, the new parties vote almost as one bloc. On sustainability they split in both directions: climate and sustainability policies are stricter than the benchmark, while policies close to management, such as ISS's Board-Aligned and Glass Lewis's Corporate Governance Focused policies, are more lenient.

These new parties differ from political parties in one important respect: a voting policy does not negotiate. A proxy advisor applies its policy across hundreds of companies and does not take up a manager's specific request with the board. Engagement with the new parties therefore takes a different form. Companies and investors shape the policies themselves, through the advisors' annual consultations, through dialogue with their research teams ahead of the AGM, and through disclosure that answers the questions a policy asks. Company-specific dialogue stays with the manager, but the votes that give it weight are increasingly governed by rules written once a year for the whole market.

This changes what engagement can achieve. In SWIPRA's 2025 governance survey, 71% of Swiss companies judge their engagements with Swiss institutional shareholders as constructive, and 65% those with non-Swiss institutional shareholders. For the four proxy advisors covered, the share is only 31% to 39%.8  The reason lies in the nature of the counterpart. An institutional investor can give a company the benefit of the doubt: it can accept a credible commitment to improve, give the board time and judge it by what follows. This is the part of engagement that companies experience as constructive. A policy cannot do this. Its rules are hard-coded, allow no exceptions and judge what is in place at the time of the AGM. A conversation with a proxy advisor can therefore only inform it about changes already made; it cannot resolve a problem that still needs time. The more votes follow policies instead of managers, the more engagement shifts from joint problem-solving to update-sharing.

One effect works in the other direction. A manager that can no longer rely on its own votes has a stronger reason to make its engagement public, for example by announcing its voting intentions before the AGM. Engagement then becomes more of a campaign aimed at other voters.

How asset managers will respond

Voting and engagement are subject to economies of scale. Research, voting infrastructure and engagement teams cost roughly the same whether they serve one fund or a hundred. This shapes how owners and managers adapt.

Few owners will vote themselves. Direct voting pays only for large owners whose views differ markedly from every policy on offer. Most owners will instead choose the manager or policy closest to their views. Academics call this voting with one's feet.

Managers will differentiate their stewardship. The more owners' views differ, and the cheaper stewardship is to run, the more distinct stewardship profiles the market will support. There is also a commercial motive. Index products are largely interchangeable, and a distinct stewardship profile is one of the few ways to escape pure fee competition.

Specialisation may happen outside the asset managers. If owners can combine a low-cost index fund with a cheap third-party voting policy, a specialised manager has little to offer. Investment and stewardship then become separate products, with proxy advisors and stewardship service providers as the specialists.

Large and small managers will choose different strategies. The largest managers serve clients with very different views and face political risk whenever they take a position. They will tend to act like broad catch-all parties and offer menus, while smaller managers take clear positions like niche parties. The Big Three's recent split of their stewardship into separate teams with their own policies fits this pattern.9 

The type of issue matters. On consensual governance topics, such as board independence or pay for performance, most owners want the same outcome, and sorting leaves the pressure on boards largely intact. On contested topics, such as climate targets, sorting splits the votes a large manager used to cast as one bloc into opposing camps. The pressure on boards partly cancels out, and in the extreme it disappears.

Evidence from Switzerland

We calibrate the model with the published voting results for 7,130 management proposals at the AGMs of the 100 largest Swiss listed companies from 2022 to 2026.10  Switzerland is a useful test case. Shareholders have binding votes on board and executive pay, yet approval rates are high.

Failed votes are rare. Of almost 6,500 binding pay votes and elections, two failed. Anchor shareholders explain part of this, as the SWIPRA figures above show. Across the market as a whole, Swiss AGM votes sit firmly in the range where a board fears a revolt far more than it expects one.

The pivotal threat is small. An investor holding 5% of the capital has, on average, a 2.3% chance of deciding the vote on the remuneration report, and less than 0.5% on binding pay votes and elections. For most companies in most years, engagement therefore works through the level of dissent a board wants to avoid, well before a vote is lost.

Pass-through voting amplifies the loss in the ability to tip a vote. Suppose a quarter of a manager's votes pass through to clients, and the manager's own policy resembles the proxy advisors' benchmark. How many of the passed-through votes still follow the manager depends on the issue. On governance items, where the specialty policies agree with the benchmark on 85% of the rules, the manager loses almost 4% of the votes behind its engagement and 4% to 5% of its ability to tip a vote. On sustainability reports, where they agree on fewer than half, it loses 13.5% of its votes and 15% to 16% of its ability to tip a vote. Pass-through voting thus weakens engagement on sustainability about three times as much as on governance. The dissent channel falls in line with the votes, and since the pivotal threat is small to begin with, the overall effect stays close to the loss of votes.

The insurance effect of fragmentation hardly matters. On governance, the policies are so similar that they behave like a single bloc, which leaves the board nothing to diversify. On sustainability, they behave like about four independent parties, but this adds less than 0.1 percentage points to the loss for a manager holding 3% to 5% of a company. The effect becomes relevant only for large blocks, such as the combined holdings of several index managers.

What to expect in the coming AGM seasons

The paper yields nine predictions that can be tested as pass-through voting spreads.

  1. Boards will respond less to engagement by managers whose clients have moved to other voting policies. The effect will depend on how far those policies diverge from the manager's position; the number of clients who choose matters much less.
  2. The effect will be strongest in markets with high approval rates, such as Switzerland, where failed votes are rare.
  3. Direct voting by owners will remain the exception, concentrated among large pension funds and other large owners with distinct views.
  4. 4.    Proxy advisors and stewardship service providers will gain influence, and companies will engage more with them.
  5. Engagement will shift from negotiated commitments towards information updates to policy providers, and companies will find engagement less constructive overall.
  6. Asset managers will make their engagement more public, including by announcing voting intentions before AGMs.
  7. Stewardship profiles will diverge across managers, and managers with a distinct profile will earn higher fees on otherwise comparable products.
  8. Votes on sustainability items will become more polarised across managers, while votes on core governance items stay aligned. Boards will feel less pressure on the former.
  9. The largest managers will offer menus of policies, while smaller managers will take clear positions.

What this means for market participants

Boards and investor relations teams. Boards need to know which voting policies stand behind their shareholders' votes, because these determine how an engagement request translates into dissent. A request from a large manager carries less weight than before on contested topics, and dissent levels will become harder to predict.

Asset managers. The uptake of the default policy is now a strategic variable. Managers have to decide whether to act as a broad platform that offers menus or to take a clear stewardship profile, and how openly to communicate their engagement priorities to the clients whose votes they no longer control.

Asset owners. Choosing a voting policy is a stewardship decision in its own right. An owner that picks a policy close to its manager's position strengthens that manager's hand in engagement. An owner that picks a different policy weakens it, which is legitimate but should be a conscious choice.

Proxy advisors and policy providers. They are becoming the parties of the new system. With that role comes more influence over company outcomes, and more scrutiny of how their policies are designed and applied. If engagement with them is to become more than update-sharing, their policies will need room to recognise credible commitments.

Regulators and standard setters. Disclosure of pass-through uptake by manager and by policy would let boards and owners see where voting power actually sits.

Pass-through voting is usually discussed as a question of legitimacy. It is also a question of effectiveness.

Conclusion

Pass-through voting is usually discussed as a question of legitimacy. It is also a question of effectiveness. By separating the votes from the manager who engages, it weakens the threat behind engagement, most of all where votes rarely fail.

The weakening may be temporary. As owners sort into managers and policies that match their views, votes may consolidate again, this time behind a more differentiated set of stewardship parties. Whether this leads to more effective stewardship or to a more polarised dialogue with boards will become visible over the next AGM seasons.

Three questions will decide the outcome:

  • Will clients stay with their manager's default policy, or spread across the menu?
  • Will proxy advisors accept the role, and the accountability, that comes with becoming the new parties?
  • How will boards read dissent that no longer comes from a few identifiable voters?

This article summarises the working paper "When the Party Loses the Whip: Pass-Through Voting and the Credibility of Shareholder Engagement" (2026).

Text: Christoph Wenk Bernasconi 

Endnotes

  1. SWIPRA Services, "First Insights into the 2026 Swiss AGM Season – Constructive Dialogue, Greater Pay Discipline", media release, 24 April 2026, https://www.swipra.ch/insight-and-news/publications/agm-analysis/swipra-media-release-mid-season-review-swiss-agm-season-2026.html.
  2. SWIPRA Services, "Swiss AGM Season Reveals Sharper Shareholder Scrutiny of Boards, Pay and Auditors", Newsletter Swiss AGM Season 2026, 7 July 2026, https://www.swipra.ch/insight-and-news/publications/agm-analysis/swipra-newsletter-swiss-agm-season-2026.html.
  3. Responsible Investor (2025), on programme uptake at BlackRock (USD 784 billion of USD 3.3 trillion eligible equity assets, second quarter of 2025) and Vanguard (82,000 investors with USD 9 billion in assets, July 2025).
  4. SWIPRA Services, "Outlook for the 2026 Swiss AGM Season: Governance at Center Stage – Boards, Pay, and Sustainability", newsletter, 13 February 2026, https://www.swipra.ch/insight-and-news/publications/andere-publikationen/swipra-newsletter-outlook-swiss-agm-season-2026.html.
  5. See note 2.
  6. Responsible Investor (2025), on policy choices by participants in Vanguard's Investor Choice programme, including the Vanguard ESG U.S. Stock ETF.
  7. Own coding of ISS, Continental Europe Proxy Voting Guidelines – Benchmark Policy Recommendations, effective 1 February 2026; Glass Lewis, 2026 Benchmark Policy Guidelines – Continental Europe; and the specialty policies of ISS (Taft-Hartley, Catholic, Climate, Global Board-Aligned, SRI, Sustainability) and Glass Lewis (Taft-Hartley, Corporate Governance Focused, Catholic, Public Pension, ESG, Climate). 70 rules were coded for Glass Lewis and 17 for ISS.
  8. SWIPRA Services, The SWIPRA Corporate Governance Survey 2025, 13th edition, December 2025; 142 participants (81 issuers, 38 asset and fund managers, 23 pension funds). Share of companies rating engagement as (very) constructive: Glass Lewis 39%, ISS 38%, Ethos 32%, Inrate 31%.
  9. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, "The 'Big Three' Shift Approach to Stewardship", 27 August 2025, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2025/08/27/the-big-three-shift-approach-to-stewardship/.
  10. Item-level voting results of the annual general meetings of the 100 largest Swiss listed companies, 2022–2026 (7,130 management proposals); own calculations.

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